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Poland and the European Community:
Toward Full Integration
By JAN KRZYSZroF BmLECKi*
L FROM THE CONCERT OF EUROPE
TO MAASTRICHT
It is difficult to call the twentieth century the century of Europe;
that description belongs rather to the ninefeenth century. It was dur-
ing the nineteenth century that several of the most powerful Euro-
pean states decided to conduct politics on a global scale and colonial
empires stretched over millions of square miles. The "mission of
spreading European civilization" to other continents was hardly ques-
tioned. The nineteenth century was also the century of the industrial
revolution, of an ever-rising standard of living, and of great hopes con-
nected with progress and international cooperation. It looked as
though things could only get better. Technical achievements and so-
cial engineering were to bring an end to poverty, hunger, and disease.
Only a few voices warned about turning a blind eye to those
forces that threatened to destroy the strenuously built order based on
the balance of power, which appeared to guarantee peace, stability,
and material prosperity. Time has shown that it was those few who
were right. World War I, the first "large scale war of white people"
finally brought the "beautiful nineteenth century," and its illusions, to
an end. The new epoch destroyed not only the previous century's illu-
sions but also its misgivings. Barely two decades separated World War
I from World War II, which was even more bloody and cruel. Techni-
cal achievements had come to mean more efficient ways of killing
people and led to genocidal experiments on a scale never before seen.
Europe had become the continent in which people were burnt to
death in ovens.
* Member of the Polish Parliament, Minister for European Integration. This article
was presented in March 1993 at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Reviews
Eleventh Annual Symposium on International Legal Practice, "The European Community
in Evolution: Toward a Closer Political & Economic Union."
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The brief period between World War I and World War II, said by
some to be a truce forced upon the conflicting states by their own
internal crises, was marked by permanent tension in international re-
lations. For Poland, these two short decades were a time of indepen-
dence and sovereignty. The tragic events of Poland's most recent past
were determined by the fact that on the threshold of the nineteenth
century Poland lost her independence and was partitioned among her
three neighboring states: Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Polish territo-
ries became provincial outposts of the three great powers. Although
these areas benefited from the pan-European developments, these
benefits came late and were often fraught with restrictions imposed by
the occupying states. Polish national history associates the nineteenth
century with armed uprisings for independence rather than with rail-
ways, steamships, and the laying of telegraph wires.
Nineteenth century Poles did not necessarily yearn for Europe;
rather, they counted on European, primarily French and British, aid in
their struggle for independence. Eventually, independence was
achieved amid the great turmoil endured in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope between 1917 and 1919. Aid from countries such as the United
States also played a significant role in this achievement.
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was a difficult continent for small
and medium-sized states. Wedged between Hitler's Germany and Sta-
lin's Soviet Union, with the onset of World War II, 'Poland found her-
self crushed by her neighbors. Although linked to France and Great
Britain by military alliances, Poland was left to defend herself. During
the six years of World War II, the Soviet Union changed from being
Hitler's ally to being aligned with Churchill and Roosevelt. Poland, a
country of thirty-five million, located in the very heart of Europe, be-
came a pawn in a great game. The victorious Red Army occupied all
of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, her inhabitants reduced to
twenty-four million and her borders redrawn, found herself behind
the "Iron Curtain." The Communists, on Moscow's behalf, took
control.
The second half of the 1940s was a period of great uncertainty.
At first the United States was unable to decide whether to remain in
Europe: The Western public had forgotten about the Hitler-Stalin
Pact, and the Red Army was seen as the hero of the war against fas-
cism. The Communist Parties of France, Italy, and Greece were
strong and influential. Many politicians contemplated a third world
war; some hoping it would take place, others fearing that it would.
However, events never reached this stage. A new order was formed
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out of peace, an order based on the division of the continent. The
Western societies which had abandoned Poland allowed Stalin to real-
ize his plans without repercussions. Poland became a member of the
"socialist camp," and in official Polish propaganda Europe came to
signify the "imperialist enemy."
Simultaneously, in Western Europe, under the protective shield
of the American forces and with the help of the Marshall Plan, war-
time ruins were quickly rebuilt. Soon the idea of a united Europe
emerged. The beginnings of unification were modest, even pedes-
trian. On April 18, 1951, six states (Belgium, France, Holland, Lux-
embourg, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany) signed The
Treaty of Paris.' This international administrative body for mining
and steel-works was to serve economic, political, and military objec-
tives. However, further attempts at integration were halted in 1954
when the French government refused to accept the concept of a politi-
cally united Europe restricting France's sovereignty.
In Eastern Europe, following the death of Stalin and the rejection
of his personality cult, a "thaw" set in. Although the Iron Curtain
parted slightly, it remained in existence, and Poland was still within
the "socialist bloc." The relaxation allowed greater contacts between
Eastern and Western Europe, but it also served to confirm the un-
questioned division between the two halves of the continent. The in-
tegration process would continue, but it would involve only Western
Europe.
The states constituting the European Coal and Steel Community
took further steps in the unification of Western Europe. On March
25, 1957 the European Economic Community' (EEC) and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community were established. 3 Eleven years
later, on April 8, 1968, the so-called Merger Treaty was enacted to
harmonize all three bodies.4
In 1989, the Communist empire collapsed before our very eyes.
The political system established by the victorious powers at the end of
World War II which had lasted throughout the Cold War toppled.
Luckily for the world, and above all for Europe, the Iron Curtain col-
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING TmE EtmoPEAN COAL AND STEEL Co.%woruNy [ECSC
TREATY].
2. TREATY ESTABLISMING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMmuNITY [EEC TREATY].
3. TRATY ESTALISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY
[EUROATOM TREATY].
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE
EURoPEAN CoMMUNIrms [MERGER TREATY].
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lapsed without a military struggle and without a civilian massacre.
The states of Central Europe gained, or in some instances regained,
independence. In addition, the republics which previously made up
the Soviet Union began demanding independence.
The system of international relations that had been based on the
global rivalry of two empires and a balance of terror no longer existed.
The repercussions of this change were felt throughout the world, but
Europe was particularly affected. With the removal of the Iron Cur-
tain, countries previously separated from Western Europe could now
lay claim to their European heritage.
On February 7, 1992, representatives of the countries of the Eco-
nomic Community (EC)5 took another step toward unification by
signing the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty).6 The historical significance
of ending the division of Europe and the need to lay lasting founda-
tions on which to build the continent's future were the foundation for
the Treaty's enactment. An integrated Europe is to be set up on the
existing three European Communities, strengthened and supple-
mented by new forms of cooperation. Any comparison of the EC to
past international organizations is fundamentally erroneous. The for-
mer not only possesses its own supreme law, which limits the sover-
eignty of member states, but also has created its own legal systems
which are independent of the member states' legal systems.
The signing of the Treaty was an attempt by the EC to avoid the
problems facing Europe. Threatened once more by national pride
and prejudice, uncertain of its identity, and incapable of responding to
all the challenges brought about by the fall of the Communist empire,
the EC sought new impetus and new bonds of solidarity.
For nearly half a century, the political and military presence of
the United States has guaranteed the stability and security of Western
Europe. This presence is still necessary and the transatlantic partner-
ship continues to be a basis of European stability. Yet, winning the
Cold War freed Americans from some of the responsibilities they
once undertook. The countries within the EC must respond to the
challenges that have arisen within their sphere of influence, and must
assume greater responsibility for the fate of Europe. The European
Community cannot shy away from its responsibilities toward the con-
tinent's future.
5. The EC now numbers twelve: Great Britain joining in 1972; Denmark and Ireland
in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
6. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Maas-
tricht 'reaty].
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The integration of Europe creates an opportunity to build the
greatest commercial and financial power in the world. The Treaty
gives equal weight to both economic and political integration. Eco-
nomic integration is imperative for the smooth functioning of a huge
market designed to allow the free interchange of goods, capital, and
services. Political integration under the Treaty allows respective states
of the Community to retain their autonomy. Member states willingly
acknowledge the Community's authority in monetary, foreign policy,
and defense matters.
The unification of Western Europe will be the cornerstone of the
continent's stability. This is very important as the post-communist
world is far from stable. Civil war rages in the former Yugoslavia,
chaos prevails in the former territories of the Soviet Union, and
Czechoslovakia has recently been replaced by two sovereign repub-
lics: Czech and Slovak.
Today, Europe faces the very real danger of an isolated Central
Europe fraught with mutually reinforcing nationalist and autarchist
tendencies. This possible development could so intensify the internal
problems of the region that any long-term prospect of pan-European
integration would become inconceivable. A deepening cultural gulf
between Eastern and Western Europe could lead to a lasting conti-
nental discord. The various dangerous tensions in the East could lead
the West to sever its ties even further and raise even more barriers.
Eventually, it could result in its building a "cordon sanitaire" along its
borders adjacent to those parts- of Europe which not only hold out
little hope of development but also appear to be a potential source of
serious problems and threats. We must break out of the vicious circle
of events that have kept the two parts of the continent separate.
H. EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF POLAND
For Poland, with nearly forty million inhabitants, lying right at the
center of the continent, integration into the EC is the basic premise of
its foreign policy and its strategic aim. Poland looks on the process of
integration into Europe as a means of finding a secure place for itself.
The sudden disintegration of the security system based on the Warsaw
Pact and East-West balance, although obviously welcomed and bene-
ficial, had the effect of throwing the European security system out of
balance, including the security of Poland and other post-communist
states. In these new circumstances, Poland is endangered by the
events taking place in the former territories of the Soviet Union and
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faces a radically reduced defense potential. The safest way for Poland
to return to the world economic and political scene could be to forge
close links and cooperation with the strengthening and expanding EC.
Polish public opinion polls indicate support for the Polish foreign
policy of joining the EC. The polls show that if a referendum concern-
ing acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty took place today, nearly two-
thirds of the people would vote for Poland's entry into the EC. Sev-
enty-seven percent of those polled expressed their belief that integra-
tion would lead to faster economic growth in the country, and sixty-six
percent believed joining the EC would increase Poland's security.
Poland is the largest country in Central Europe, and it is a coun-
try with both strategic and geopolitical significance. Consequently,
Poland could become an important element in the process of building
a new Europe. Without the benefit of integration into the EC, coun-
tries such as Poland will be unable to respond to political, social, and
economic challenges. It is in Poland's best interest to avoid becoming
a minor European power, involved only on the periphery of the
emerging system. Poland must not allow herself to become a buffer
state between the EC and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
History has shown that sooner or later such states are crushed.
Despite the efforts of the twelve EC member states, a significant
disparity still exists within the group. Such disparity is illustrated by
the levels of economic development and wealth of Holland and Ger-
many on the one hand and of Greece and Portugal on the other. Even
rigorous enforcement of parity schemes will not solve the dilemma the
Community now faces: whether the EC should be fully integrated and
consolidated prior to expansion or whether the more rational ap-
proach would be to simultaneously strengthen internal relations and
extend membership to new states.
If EC member states choose the first course of action and concen-
trate exclusively on European integration, the efforts of countries
such as Poland to rapidly secure full membership in the EC will be
hampered. When such countries are finally invited to integrate, polit-
ical and economic differences among the states could present un-
surpassable barriers.
Poland's economy is still in a difficult position, and partial inte-
gration with Europe will not be particularly beneficial. Poland does
not want to be a passive consumer of western goods but rather seeks
to have her economy strengthened by large investment and to partici-
pate on an equal footing in the international division of labor. This
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goal is another reason why Poland seeks a cohesive community with
all the political and economic implications.
There is some opposition from Polish as well as EC politicians to
Poland's joining the EC. However, we should not be discouraged by
temporary difficulties, and we must continue to strive for a calendar of
full membership to be drawn up. The stages of admission could be
harmonized with the stages of the EC's internal consolidation. The
dilemma is whether a deepening or enlarging of the community would
be to Poland's advantage. Poland realizes that she is not yet ready for
economic integration with the EC countries. Over forty years of isola-
tion have resulted in wide disparity between the Polish and Western
European economies. There is a growing gap between the per capita
income of the average Pole and that of the average resident of the
Western part of the continent. For this reason, Poland does not insist
on immediate membership but rather insists that concrete terms of
entry and precise conditions of entry be drafted.
Poland does not expect miracles and does not anticipate that en-
try into the EC will automatically secure for Poland the development
and prosperity enjoyed by the twelve EC member states. Hard work,
determination, and management abilities will be the fundamental and
decisive factors in Poland's transition to a modern economy. How-
ever, Poland will not achieve faster growth and prosperity without be-
ing open to the world and without drawing on the experience and help
of others. It is equally hard to imagine Poland's success without the
EC being open to Poland.
nM. THE PROMISE OF POLISH ECONOMIC REFORMS
In 1989, Poland became the first Eastern bloc country to repel
communism. The first government of the independent Poland decided
to introduce a series of radical and painful reforms based on the tenets
of economic freedom. Administrative restrictions on economic activ-
ity were abolished, and the complete de-monopolization of trade links
abroad followed. Poland succeeded in introducing the internal con-
vertibility of Polish currency, the first step to full convertibility.
In 1991 a new duty tariff was introduced. This duty tariff con-
forms with those in force in EC member countries. Restrictions on
imports and import licenses remain in only a few areas. The exchange
rate of the zloty and the duty tariff are the basic means of export and
import regulation. After decades of strict price control, price policies
in Poland are now far more liberal than those in any EC country. The
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prices of goods and services are freely fixed by the producers, the tax
system is being reformed, and a Value Added Tax (VAT) and account-
ing system meeting international standards will be introduced on July
7, 1993.
Polish foreign investment law guarantees all economic entities,
domestic and foreign, equal rights and responsibilities. Foreign inves-
tors have the right to absolute and unconditional profit transfer. The
law protects against political risks and guarantees compensation in the
case of loss incurred due to nationalization or expropriation.
Poland is sometimes treated by potential foreign investors as a
high risk country. Yet, Poland is the only country among those that
gained or regained independence following the fall of communism
which is not threatened by collapse, which has no territorial preten-
sions toward its neighbors, and which has undisputed borders. Poland
is also the only country from the former Communist bloc whose econ-
omy is moving out of recession. The positive tendencies registered in
the first three quarters of 1992 continued throughout the fourth quar-
ter. A thirteen percent rise in the sale of manufactured goods and
property development (as compared to the previous year), a slowing
inflation rate, a rise in output, and further development of the private
sector are major achievements and should not be underestimated. The
growth of the private sector is especially encouraging; at present more
than forty-five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is produced
by the private sector. During the past three years, more than 1.7 mil-
lion new private companies have set up in a country with a population
of barely 40 million. More than eighty percent of retail and wholesale
trade and road transport is in private hands. The private sector also
provides at least half the country's work places.
Poland's GDP, which in 1990, the first year of shock therapy, fell
by twelve percent, and the following year by eight percent, was fore-
cast to reach a two percent growth level by 1992. Positive develop-
ments took place in foreign trade. Due to a large increase in exports,
Poland has a foreign trade surplus. In addition, unemployment has
stabilized.
Poland is beginning to benefit from the decisiveness with which it
set out on the road to a market economy. The other countries of the
former Communist bloc decided on a far more evolutionary approach.
Those countries are now beginning to experience a protracted reces-
sion resulting from their structural transformations and the collapse of
the former Soviet Union's market, on which all were dependent.
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IV. THE EUROPE AGREEMENT
A. Genesis
The Treaty of Rome authorizes the Community to negotiate trea-
ties of association with a third state. Such treaties define mutual rights
and responsibilities, lay the foundation for economic cooperation, and
establish special procedures. In May 1990, Poland submitted a formal
request for the opening of association negotiations. The negotiations
began in December 1990 amid optimism from both the European
Commission ("Commission") and the Polish government. The negoti-
ations were expected to last until mid-1992, but the first round of ne-
gotiations dispelled these hopes. Next to the very definition of the
type of Poland's association - full membership in the EC - the most
controversial issue was the admission of Polish products into the mar-
kets of the member states. Four groups of products were singled out:
steel, coal, textiles, and agricultural products.
The initial feeling about giving Poland priority was replaced dur-
ing the course of the negotiations by the Commission's eagerness to
close the Community market to Poland. At the same time the Polish
negotiators attempted to win concessions. The Commission wavered
in the face of the coup d'etat in Moscow and the general uncertainty
about the future.
On December 16, 1991, an agreement was signed establishing an
association between the EC (and its member states) and the Polish
Republic. At the same time, the EC signed agreements with Hungary
and Czechoslovakia. These three treaties are called the Europe
Agreement ("Agreement"). Although the EC has signed a series of
agreements on economic cooperation (agreements of association,
tariff integration, and trade treaties), the current agreement differs in
regard to the provisions on political dialogue, the harmonization of
the EC and Central European legal systems, and cultural cooperation.
Had the agreement been ratified by Poland, the European Parliament,
and the parliaments of the twelve members states, it would have taken
effect in January 1993. Nevertheless, the trade section of the treaty
has been binding since March 1992.
B. Fundamental Provisions
The most significant aspect of the Europe Agreement is the insti-
tution of a free trade area in accordance with article 24 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). This provision excludes ag-
ricultural products and is not a tariff union as was the EC's association
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with Turkey and Greece. In addition to lifting tariffs between the sig-
natories, a tariff union would create a uniform tariff barrier vis-h-vis
third countries. The free trade agreement is a significant achievement,
but a tariff union is an essential condition for membership in the Com-
munity. Unfortunately, despite the persistent efforts of Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, and Poland, a declaration expressing the Community's
support for their entry into the trade union was not achieved.
The Agreement's second article provides that the signatories in-
tend to establish regular political dialogue in order to strengthen rela-
tions between Poland and the EC, assist economic and political reform
in Poland, and establish new bonds of solidarity. The objectives of
political dialogue and cooperation, which are later defined in more
detail, are to facilitate Poland's full integration into the community of
democratic states and to promote gradual harmonization with the
Community.
The preamble to the Agreement between Poland and the EC
maintains that Poland's ultimate objective is to obtain EC member-
ship. However, this is exclusively Poland's objective, not one en-
dorsed by both sides. The Agreement does not even state the
conditions which Poland will have to meet if it is to become a member
of the Community. The Polish association agreement was an eco-
nomic and political compromise. The purport and assumptions of the
Agreement are modeled on the Treaty of Rome, which instituted the
EEC. Some of its provisions, particularly those concerning the princi-
ples of trade liberalization and the movement of capital have been
adopted from the Treaty of Rome with minimal changes. The Agree-
ment is of indefinite duration, but it envisions a ten-year transition
period after which Poland may be allowed to join the EC by way of an
area of free trade for manufactured goods. Whether this will actually
occur is difficult to predict. The "transitional period" might be ex-
tended though this would not be in Poland's interests. The most es-
sential element in the Agreement is the principle of asymmetry, which
Poland demanded throughout the negotiations. Poland is to gain ac-
cess to the EC market before the end of 1997; the EC will gain access
to the Polish market before the end of 1999. The absolute exemption
from tariff duties would initially account for approximately fifty-five
percent of Poland's exports and twenty-five percent of Poland's im-
ports. The tariffs will be gradually reduced year by year until they are
eventually eliminated; however, the lowering of duties on Polish ex-
ports will not begin until 1995. These provisions will buy Poland es-
sential time to bring a variety of sectors up to European standards.
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Financial aid from the Community in the form of grants and loans will
help reduce disparities.
The Agreement conforms with the principles of free trade by ef-
fectively limiting opportunities for unilateral protective policies on the
part of Poland such as raising tariffs, setting import and export quotas,
or other similar measures. Signatories may, however, adopt excep-
tional measures to protect their markets or the balance of payments
within rigorously defined limits.
The Agreement makes no mention of free trade in agricultural
products. Poland, unlike the member states, simply cannot afford
huge agricultural subsidies. Nevertheless, Poland's pork, poultry, and
vegetable producers benefit from the Agreement because the EC has
raised the ceiling on the import of these goods. In addition, Poland has
lowered duties on specific items not domestically produced such as
citrus fruits, tea, and certain types of cheese. However, Poland has
not managed to secure agreement on limiting export subsidies. Such
subsidies constitute a serious threat to both Poland and Hungary.
Apart from economic matters, the Agreement speaks - admit-
tedly in rather general terms - of forms of political dialogue, cultural
and social cooperation, and the exchange of information. The final
sections of the Agreement are devoted to institutional cooperation be-
tween the signatories. It is expected that an Association Commission
will be established to monitor implementation of the agreement and
arbitrate eventual disputes.
Implementation of the Agreement should secure Poland's eco-
nomic development. Full implementation would lead to a reduction
of barriers hindering the free movement of goods and services, a par-
tial reduction of the obstacles to the movement of capital, an increase
in Poland's credibility in the eyes of foreign investors, and a chance of
attracting modem machinery and know-how without having to negoti-
ate new loans.
C. Consequences for the Polish Legal System
Under Communist rule the Polish legal system served the goals of
central planning and management. Numerous regulations allowed the
government to intervene in state economic institutions and other en-
terprises. These regulations were fundamentally inimical to the free
movement of labor and capital. Over the last three years, many re-
forms have been instituted in order to adapt Polish law to free market
requirements. However, not every step has been taken. Therefore,
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one condition of entry to the EC is the adaptation of Polish legislation
to that of the EC. The harmonization of legal regulations includes
tariff law, company law, banking law, accounting and corporate tax,
intellectual property, competition principles, and regulations relating
to health and safety in the work place.
The Europe Agreement states that Polish law must adapt to the
EC law within a ten-year period. Ten years is ample time to establish
priorities and proceed with harmonization. Among all of the Agree-
ment's requirements, harmonization of the legal system is the least
controversial. Even if Poland had not attempted to join the Commu-
nity and had not signed the Agreement, reforms would still have been
introduced to make the Polish legal infrastructure compatible with
those of her main economic partners.
The fact that Poland is a civil law country makes the task of har-
monization easier. Many Polish institutions have been modeled on
the French, German, and Austrian systems. Nevertheless, in a few ar-
eas, such as regulations restricting subsidies to state enterprises, the
EC standards will raise problems and even conflicts, due to the rapid
pace of integration.
It should be noted that the Europe Agreement allows signatories
a large degree of freedom and does not demand that, in most areas,
Community institutions be followed slavishly. Poland is only required
to harmonize its legal regulations with current and future Community
legislation in business law, consumer rights, and employment rights.
Poland can choose from among the quite varied internal legal models
of the EC member states. It also must be remembered that many ar-
eas deemed priorities by the Agreement are not in fact integrated
within the already existing EC states. These areas range from tax law
to the important areas of employment and company law. Legislation
regulating employee participation in work-place management is an ex-
ample of the lack of integration. In countries such as Germany and
Holland there is fairly advanced participation, at least on inspection
committees, whereas a completely different system exists in Britain.
Many difficulties confront Poland during the integration process;
there is no need to add further upheavals of a legal nature. The con-
tinuity and coherence of Poland's legal system must be maintained.
Preference should be given to the reformist methods of harmonization
as long as they are able to ensure a sufficient degree of legal
conformity.
In some sectors, a unified system of law is absolutely imperative.
Real integration will never take place unless a common, uniform mar-
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ket is created. However, complete uniformity is not required as is il-
lustrated by the United States. U.S. federal regulations deal only with
the most important aspects of the market such as antitrust regulation
and taxes. The Uniform Commercial Code provides a framework for
basic commercial transactions, and securities regulations police the
capital markets. Yet in many other areas connected with the function-
ing of the market, legal regulation is a matter of state law.
D. The Effect on Polish Manufacturing
The virtue of the Europe Agreement is its recognition of "open
provisions." Though on the issues of free trade, such as the sale of
goods, the provisions of the Agreement are relatively closed (which
facilitates other freedoms, such as the freedom of movement), the
pace of integration is self-determining. This allows the signatories to
speed up harmonization in areas they consider important and to slow
them down in areas deemed less important. It is imperative that Po-
land encourage the growth and development of the financial services
sector if it is to attract foreign investors.
Once linked to the EC, Poland will be one of its largest member
states in terms of both area and population. However, from the point
of view of its economic potential it will be near the bottom of the list.
The greatest disparity between Poland and the EC is not just in Po-
land's economic capacity but also in the levels of health care and envi-
ronmental protection.
Disproportionate economic potential results from the fact that
while Polish exports do not have a serious impact on the EC market
(apart from a few, narrowly defined areas such as unprocessed steel
products and some textile and agricultural products), the Community
is a major factor in Poland's foreign trade. The dramatic fall in trade
with the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) countries has to a large extent been compensated for
by the growth in trade with EC countries (in 1990, this stood at more
than forty-six percent, and in 1992, more than fifty-five percent). In
other words, fluctuations which might be significant for Poland, even
to the point of determining the very existence of many Polish produ-
cers, have a marginal impact on the Community.
The opening of free trade between Poland and the EC offers an
opportunity to intensify mutual trade during the transition period and
to reform the export structure so that manufactured goods play a
greater role. The nature of Polish exports to developed countries in
the post-war period has not been advantageous. Since these exports
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are dominated by agricultural products and raw materials, they mani-
fest Poland's low level of economic development.
Changes in the structure of exports and the growth of trade must
be stimulated by direct foreign investment. Tax incentives and prefer-
ences for domestic investment in indigenous manufacturing must also
be developed. Industrial cooperation with western European compa-
nies should stimulate the growth in Poland's foreign trade of manufac-
tured products. At the moment, the share of manufactured products
is far lower than in highly developed countries.
The Agreement has implications for Poland's economic policies
during the transition period, primarily in the areas of trade and indus-
trial, agricultural, technological, and political reform policies. The
Agreement will give Polish non-agricultural products - with the excep-
tion of textiles, coal, steel, and certain raw materials - unrestricted en-
try to the Common Market. It is imperative that at the moment the
Agreement comes into effect the government assist and stimulate Po-
land's infant manufacturing industry through appropriate policies that
could allow new technology to enter Poland.
In addition, financial and organizational mechanisms that facili-
tate the modernization and reform of the most threatened industries
should be developed during the transition period. It is also important
that Polish agriculture be reformed. Government policies must give
priority to the development of the service sector in rural areas and to
the stimulation of manufactured agricultural articles.
E. The Effect on the Polish Services Sector
In the area of services, both Poland and the EC countries are
obliged, from the moment the Agreement comes into effect, to guar-
antee the citizens and companies of the other signatory countries
treatment equal to that received by their own citizens and companies.
In certain sectors there will inevitably be some delays in implementa-
tion of this goal. The delays may extend until the end of the first stage
of the Agreement, or even until the end of the transition period. Dur-
ing the first stage of the transition period, companies may be set up in
the service sectors, with the exception of financial services and legal
services. However, legal services providing advice on international
law and trade may be established during this time.
If Poland is to benefit from the Agreement, it must develop spe-
cialization in the service sector. It is obvious that in the next few years
it will be impossible to reach European standards in every area of this
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sector. It will take years to close the gaps resulting from years of iso-
lation. However, improvement in some sectors looks very promising.
It is anticipated that some Polish companies will soon be ready to
open subsidiaries on EC territory.
Due to the liberalization of the service sector, firms experienced
in finance, management, and privatization will be attracted to Poland.
Although these are activities requiring little capital, they do require
highly qualified and specialized personnel. The availability of such
business services should bring cost and quality improvements, thus in-
creasing the competitiveness of Polish products. In addition, new jobs
will be created since financial, banking, and insurance services are la-
bor intensive.
Most investors base themselves in the capital city of Warsaw due
to the communications system, office space availability and suitability,
proximity of foreign representatives and embassies, and large pool of
trained labor. In a modem economy, a well developed service sector
is essential to the efficient functioning of the whole economic system
and is imperative for dynamic economic growth. Therefore, the Polish
government should encourage foreign capital both to invest in and
promote the development of services in the regions with the highest
unemployment.
The tourist industry requires particular attention and needs large
scale investment if it is to grow. This industry should prove particu-
larly attractive to potential investors due to its relatively quick returns.
Domestic investors tend only to build "guest-houses" and hotels in
already densely-populated resorts. Foreign investment is essential to
the growth of this sector.
The Europe Agreement deals with matters affecting Polish busi-
ness entities operating within the EC member states and vice versa.
The Agreement's resolutions are modeled on provisions in the Treaty
of Rome. As soon as the Agreement comes into effect, the EC will
grant Poland the same rights to set up companies on its soil as those
enjoyed by member states' companies. However, Poland will recipro-
cate gradually, and in particularly sensitive areas such as the financial
sector the right to set up companies will only be granted at the end of
the transition period.
F. The Effect on Polish Agriculture
As noted above, the Agreement makes no reference to free trade
in agricultural products. Only a.very gradual and cautious liberaliza-
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tion of access to EC markets is foreseen during the first five years. At
the same time, the scale of growth will still not be sufficient to have a
dramatic effect on Polish agriculture. At the end of the association
period, the Polish agricultural sector will be far less integrated with
the EC economy than will other sectors. While free trade area mecha-
nisms will be in place in the industrial sector, the agricultural sector
will still be regulated, to some extent, by the state.
The Europe Agreement does not impose any restrictions on Po-
land's domestic agricultural policies. In spite of this, over the next few
years Poland will be forced to initiate policies resembling those in
force in the Community. The very fact of association could have a
direct effect on Polish agricultural policies, but this has nothing to do
with the Europe Agreement. It is essential that Poli;h agricultural pol-
icies adjust to the market economy.
G. The Effect on the Structure of Polish Companies
The economy of communist Poland was characterized by the pre-
dominance of large companies and vertically organized state concerns.
Some of them still exist. In the EC, however, most firms are small or
medium sized, employing between ten and five hundred workers. The
crucial role of small and medium sized companies in the contempo-
rary economies of highly developed countries results from the fact
that they are efficient instruments for solving problems such as unem-
ployment or regional and branch restructuring. During the last three
years Poland has lifted barriers and restrictions to facilitate the devel-
opment of private companies. This policy has had impressive results.
The key to this success is found in the energy and imagination
which is released when working "for oneself." Indeed, policies sup-
porting the development of small and medium sized concerns have
not been introduced by either central or local government. In EC
states and the Community itself, these policies consist of creating the
appropriate conditions for the development of small and medium
sized companies, and they require state subsidies and experienced
administration.
Poland's financial limits mean that these opportunities for eco-
nomic development have not been pursued. The Europe Agreement
offers Poland concrete assistance in building small and medium sized
firms. This assistance takes the form of legal, administrative, technical,
tax and financial conditions, and specialist services through training
and advice in accounting and marketing.
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V. CONCLUSION
We must be realistic and acknowledge that during the life of the
Europe Agreement it will be extremely difficult to reach the economic
level of even the weakest economic members of the EC. These weak
member states will employ mechanisms, reinforced by Community
money, to refuse Poland access to the EC. The objective of Polish
policies should be to expand her area of economic access vis-A-vis EC
countries so that the distance between Poland and the EC does not
increase.
Between 1996 and 1999, the matter of Poland's membership in
the EC may become the subject of concrete negotiations. The EC
countries will enter a phase of transformation working towards Euro-
pean Union. That is, of course, if this process is not brought to a halt
by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty. In furtherance of Poland's
membership in an integrated Europe, every arm of Polish government
will have to be careful about its price policies, rates of exchange, bal-
ance of payments, levels of budget deficit, and public debt. Political
factors will also be of extreme importance.
Politics should always serve a certain ideal, a certain vision, even
if this vision is not a sophisticated one. At the moment it seems as if
European politics suffers from a lack of vision. After the fall of com-munism, the obvious answer to the question "whose Europe?" should
be, "all Europeans'." Unfortunately, this is rarely the answer given by
people whose opinions are decisive for the future of Europe. Instead,
we get manifestations of a clear mistrust toward political develop-
ments in the new European democracies.
It appears that a sense of parochialism has entered into European
thinking. Paradoxically, this parochialism has arisen in the same year
which was supposed to witness a pan-European euphoria to be
brought about by the spectacular birth of a new integrated Europe.
Until recently, it seemed that it was we, the people behind the
Iron Curtain, the people beyond the pale, who were the ones lacking
broad political thinking. Today it seems as if the blinders are worn by
west Europeans; they can only see themselves, persisting in the belief
in a lasting peace paid for by the division of Europe, and hoping that
without political will and political determination, they can defend
their own security and welfare. The European Community must not
ignore political reality; it must not concentrate on itself alone. If the
twenty-first century is really to be the century of Europe, it must be,
the century of all of Europe.
1993]

